Reconsidering paternalism in clinical research

Lynn Jansen, Steven Wall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The ethical standards that regulate clinical research have multiple rationales. Among them is the need to protect potential subjects from making imprudent decisions, which extends beyond the soft paternalistic concern to protect people from making uninformed decisions to participate in trials. This article argues that a plausible risk/benefit restriction on clinical trials is presumptively justified by hard paternalism, which in turn is supported by a deeper fairness-based rationale. This presumptive case for hard paternalism in research is not defeated by the alleged right to participate in clinical trials, by concerns about insult or status, by the need to conduct early phase trials that promise little to no benefit to participants, or by the recognition that some potential subjects are altruistically motivated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)50-58
Number of pages9
JournalBioethics
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

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Paternalism
paternalism
Decision Making
Clinical Trials
Research
decision making
fairness
Clinical Research

Keywords

  • Ethics
  • Fairness
  • Informed consent
  • Paternalism
  • Research on human subjects

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health(social science)
  • Philosophy
  • Health Policy

Cite this

Reconsidering paternalism in clinical research. / Jansen, Lynn; Wall, Steven.

In: Bioethics, Vol. 32, No. 1, 01.01.2018, p. 50-58.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Jansen, Lynn ; Wall, Steven. / Reconsidering paternalism in clinical research. In: Bioethics. 2018 ; Vol. 32, No. 1. pp. 50-58.
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