Is there a need for clinical neuroskepticism?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Clinical neuroethics and neuroskepticism are recent entrants to the vocabulary of neuroethics. Clinical neuroethics has been used to distinguish problems of clinical relevance arising from developments in brain science from problems arising in neuroscience research proper. Neuroskepticism has been proposed as a counterweight to claims about the value and likely implications of developments in neuroscience. These two emergent streams of thought intersect within the practice of neurology. Neurologists face many traditional problems in bioethics, like end of life care in the persistent vegetative state, determination of capacity in progressive dementia, and requests for assisted suicide in cognition-preserving neurodegenerative disease (like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Neurologists also look to be at the forefront of downstream clinical applications of neuroscience, like pharmacological enhancement of mental life. At the same time, the practice of neurology, concerned primarily with the structure, function, and treatment of the nervous system, has historically fostered a kind of skeptical attitude toward its own subject matter. Not all problems that appear primarily neurological are primarily neurological. This disciplinary skepticism is generally clinical in orientation and limited in scope. The rise of interest in clinical neuroethics and in neuroskepticsim generally suggests a possible broader application. The clinical skepticism of neurology provides impetus for thinking about the appropriate role for skepticism in clinical areas of neuroethics. After a brief review of neuroskepticism and clinical neuroethics, a taxonomy of clinical neuroskepticism is offered and reasons why a stronger rather than weaker form of clinical neuroskepticism is currently warranted.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)251-259
Number of pages9
JournalNeuroethics
Volume4
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2011

Fingerprint

Neurology
Neurosciences
Assisted Suicide
Persistent Vegetative State
Bioethics
Terminal Care
Vocabulary
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
Neurodegenerative Diseases
Cognition
Nervous System
Dementia
Pharmacology
Brain
Research
Neurologists
Therapeutics

Keywords

  • Clinical ethics
  • Clinical neuroethics
  • Neuroethics
  • Neurology
  • Neuroscience
  • Neuroskepticism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy
  • Neurology
  • Psychiatry and Mental health

Cite this

Is there a need for clinical neuroskepticism? / Klein, Eran.

In: Neuroethics, Vol. 4, No. 3, 11.2011, p. 251-259.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Klein, Eran. / Is there a need for clinical neuroskepticism?. In: Neuroethics. 2011 ; Vol. 4, No. 3. pp. 251-259.
@article{39acdea7073a449b9f1a669690e72745,
title = "Is there a need for clinical neuroskepticism?",
abstract = "Clinical neuroethics and neuroskepticism are recent entrants to the vocabulary of neuroethics. Clinical neuroethics has been used to distinguish problems of clinical relevance arising from developments in brain science from problems arising in neuroscience research proper. Neuroskepticism has been proposed as a counterweight to claims about the value and likely implications of developments in neuroscience. These two emergent streams of thought intersect within the practice of neurology. Neurologists face many traditional problems in bioethics, like end of life care in the persistent vegetative state, determination of capacity in progressive dementia, and requests for assisted suicide in cognition-preserving neurodegenerative disease (like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Neurologists also look to be at the forefront of downstream clinical applications of neuroscience, like pharmacological enhancement of mental life. At the same time, the practice of neurology, concerned primarily with the structure, function, and treatment of the nervous system, has historically fostered a kind of skeptical attitude toward its own subject matter. Not all problems that appear primarily neurological are primarily neurological. This disciplinary skepticism is generally clinical in orientation and limited in scope. The rise of interest in clinical neuroethics and in neuroskepticsim generally suggests a possible broader application. The clinical skepticism of neurology provides impetus for thinking about the appropriate role for skepticism in clinical areas of neuroethics. After a brief review of neuroskepticism and clinical neuroethics, a taxonomy of clinical neuroskepticism is offered and reasons why a stronger rather than weaker form of clinical neuroskepticism is currently warranted.",
keywords = "Clinical ethics, Clinical neuroethics, Neuroethics, Neurology, Neuroscience, Neuroskepticism",
author = "Eran Klein",
year = "2011",
month = "11",
doi = "10.1007/s12152-010-9089-x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "4",
pages = "251--259",
journal = "Neuroethics",
issn = "1874-5490",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is there a need for clinical neuroskepticism?

AU - Klein, Eran

PY - 2011/11

Y1 - 2011/11

N2 - Clinical neuroethics and neuroskepticism are recent entrants to the vocabulary of neuroethics. Clinical neuroethics has been used to distinguish problems of clinical relevance arising from developments in brain science from problems arising in neuroscience research proper. Neuroskepticism has been proposed as a counterweight to claims about the value and likely implications of developments in neuroscience. These two emergent streams of thought intersect within the practice of neurology. Neurologists face many traditional problems in bioethics, like end of life care in the persistent vegetative state, determination of capacity in progressive dementia, and requests for assisted suicide in cognition-preserving neurodegenerative disease (like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Neurologists also look to be at the forefront of downstream clinical applications of neuroscience, like pharmacological enhancement of mental life. At the same time, the practice of neurology, concerned primarily with the structure, function, and treatment of the nervous system, has historically fostered a kind of skeptical attitude toward its own subject matter. Not all problems that appear primarily neurological are primarily neurological. This disciplinary skepticism is generally clinical in orientation and limited in scope. The rise of interest in clinical neuroethics and in neuroskepticsim generally suggests a possible broader application. The clinical skepticism of neurology provides impetus for thinking about the appropriate role for skepticism in clinical areas of neuroethics. After a brief review of neuroskepticism and clinical neuroethics, a taxonomy of clinical neuroskepticism is offered and reasons why a stronger rather than weaker form of clinical neuroskepticism is currently warranted.

AB - Clinical neuroethics and neuroskepticism are recent entrants to the vocabulary of neuroethics. Clinical neuroethics has been used to distinguish problems of clinical relevance arising from developments in brain science from problems arising in neuroscience research proper. Neuroskepticism has been proposed as a counterweight to claims about the value and likely implications of developments in neuroscience. These two emergent streams of thought intersect within the practice of neurology. Neurologists face many traditional problems in bioethics, like end of life care in the persistent vegetative state, determination of capacity in progressive dementia, and requests for assisted suicide in cognition-preserving neurodegenerative disease (like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Neurologists also look to be at the forefront of downstream clinical applications of neuroscience, like pharmacological enhancement of mental life. At the same time, the practice of neurology, concerned primarily with the structure, function, and treatment of the nervous system, has historically fostered a kind of skeptical attitude toward its own subject matter. Not all problems that appear primarily neurological are primarily neurological. This disciplinary skepticism is generally clinical in orientation and limited in scope. The rise of interest in clinical neuroethics and in neuroskepticsim generally suggests a possible broader application. The clinical skepticism of neurology provides impetus for thinking about the appropriate role for skepticism in clinical areas of neuroethics. After a brief review of neuroskepticism and clinical neuroethics, a taxonomy of clinical neuroskepticism is offered and reasons why a stronger rather than weaker form of clinical neuroskepticism is currently warranted.

KW - Clinical ethics

KW - Clinical neuroethics

KW - Neuroethics

KW - Neurology

KW - Neuroscience

KW - Neuroskepticism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=82155186081&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=82155186081&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s12152-010-9089-x

DO - 10.1007/s12152-010-9089-x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:82155186081

VL - 4

SP - 251

EP - 259

JO - Neuroethics

JF - Neuroethics

SN - 1874-5490

IS - 3

ER -